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Africa
Abstract
I investigate the role of educational attainment on state failure and political stability across the African
continent. For the empirical analysis, I estimate a Linear Probability Model (LPM) for State Failure by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I hypothesize that differences in educational attainment in Africa can
explain differences in political stability and state failure. Furthermore, I believe that this effect has
persisted over time and that early educational attainment in the late colonial and early independence era
is a significant determinant of state affairs in more recent times. I find that early secondary educational
attainment explains higher state stability, while tertiary education explains more state instability later on.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

In this paper, I focus on the direct implications of a nation's failure to develop
well functioning institutions in the education sector. More specifically, this paper
investigates the role of educational attainment on state failure throughout Africa
since 1950, the beginning of the independence era. More so, has the effect of
higher educational attainment persisted overtime? The study uses 31 countries
ranging from the northernmost tip of Africa to the southernmost. Although
educational attainment is not directly an institution, a country's academic
achievement is most likely highly correlated with how well the educational sector
functions. My investigation is heavily motivated by the work of Robert Rotberg
(2003) on the failure and collapse of modern states and builds upon the work of
Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel (1996) on political stability and growth.
The issue of state failure and instability is one of great concern for the west and
the inhabitants of fragile states throughout Africa. Terrorist groups such as Boko
Haram (Nigeria), Ansar Dine (Mali), Al-Shabaab (Somalia), and al-Qa’ida
(Niger, Mali, Algeria) just to name a few have developed in these unstable
regions. In addition, not much empirical work has been done on the issue of state
failure, specifically identifying a causal channel for a nations state of affairs. The
implications of these untested hypothesis is huge, as unstable states are known to
be problematic. An examination of this magnitude, is a international security
concern, as terrorist groups are known to emerge from weak or failed states. To
add, said states are among the poorest and most underdeveloped. Therefore, it is
important to understand what pushes a state to collapse, in hope that policy can
work to improve the political and economic stability throughout Africa.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I provide an overview
of the existing literature. In Section 3, I present my theory of initial human
capital on political outcomes. Section 4, presents my empirical strategy and
econometric issues. Section 5 briefly describes the data and important descriptive
statistics. Section 6 presents my results, and Section 7 concludes.

II.

THE LITERATURE

In the field of economics, it seems that the subject of economic development has
received a great deal of attention since the early twentieth century. Much work
has been done to uncover the foundations of economic growth in developing and
advanced countries in an attempt to answer the crucial question: Why are some
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countries rich and some poor? Early on, Solow (1956), Cass (1965), and
Koopmans (1965) theorized that differences in growth rates could be explained by
differences in factor accumulation, the more traditional neo-classical growth
models. In particular, Solow argued that cross-country differences in factor
accumulation can be attributed to differences in a country's savings rate, while
Cass and Koopmans argued that preferences are the key. However, in 1991,
Douglas North introduced the role that formal institutions play in development.
As North put it (1991, p. 97): “Institutions provide the incentive structure of an
economy; as that structure evolves, it shapes the direction of economic change
towards growth, stagnation, or decline.” Over the past two decades, theories of
institutional development have come to dominate the economic development
debate, in that creating efficient institutions and improving upon old ones drive
development. In addition, Barro’s work on the effect of human capital
accumulation (1981, 1996, 2001, 2004) on development has made a major impact
in academia and policy making circles. Barro (2001) found that educational
attainment at the secondary and tertiary level, had significant positive growth
effects. In Barro’s work he proxies human capital with educational attainment.
Although Barro’s recent work on human capital is praised, one must give credit to
the work of Romer (1990). It is clear that existing empirical literature on the
relationship between education (human capital) and growth is rich, and that the
models derive concrete results and show that the relationship between education
and growth is positive. However, I believe that empirical literature discussing the
implications that educational progress can have for a nation, other than economic
outcomes is lacking.
Rotberg (2003) presents theoretical literature, analyzing the causal channels
behind the failure and collapse of nation-states over the past 30 years. He notes
that the academic literature and its implications for international security have
found its way to the forefront of international affairs as the number of people
impoverished, starving, and deprived of fundamental needs such as defense,
healthcare, and education has totaled in the hundreds of millions, killed eight
million, and displaced another four million; roughly speaking. Also, the
developments in these weak states are a major concern to the more developed
states, in a political and economic context. He shows that throughout history,
weak states have failed or stayed weak for a number of reasons, such as a nation's
geographical, physical, historical, and political circumstances. However, his
evidence shows that individual leader’s political and economic actions have
almost always paved the way to state failure. Rotberg’s theoretical work links
previous empirical literature on education (human capital) with a framework in
which we can empirically test the implications of higher initial human capital on
state stability. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, and Swagel’s (1996) work helps shed
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some light on the link between political instability and economic growth, essential
and quite similar to my analysis. In short, they find that political instability
reduces growth, and that the occurrence of a government change increases the
likelihood of subsequent changes, suggesting that political instability tends to be
persistent over time. However, they neglect the root of this instability, which I
hope to unveil in my work. Note that Alesina and Perotti (1996) suggest that the
link goes through the effect of instability on investment, however I believe that it
goes through education.
Existing literature on education in Africa is abundant and serves my purposes well
in developing my hypothesis. Huillery (2009) finds that in French West Africa,
investments in education during the colonial period persisted over time. This idea
of persistent effects of education, is essential in my analysis. To add, Foster
(1977) shows that in most developing countries the modern sector is small,
however there are considerable benefits accrued by the people who have access to
these positions. Bates (1981) documents the policy behind African nations
transformation to a more modern industrialized economy, as well as the
implications for social stratification. These esteemed opportunities are awarded
economic and status benefits, and importantly an immense premium is placed
upon the possession of formal educational credentials for access to these
positions. This type of atmosphere led to an increase in demand for higher
education in the post colonial period. However, such an increase in supply, in turn
increases the demand for more higher education. Eventually, supply outruns
demand and the successful elites end up benefiting at the expense of the less
successful masses. Thus, african formal education throughout the independence
era has in turn promoted political instability, as the masses become unsatisfied.
Hanf, Ammann, Dias, Fremery, and Weiland (1975) conclude that this political
instability has stemmed from the only political result of education in Africa,
maintaining elites socioeconomic status in society as they are able to reinforce
their position by securing privileged access to schools. To add, Bibby and Peil
(1974) note that access and continuance in education throughout Africa is highly
dependent on the social and ethnic origin of the individual, in line with Hanf,
Ammann, Dias, Fremery, and Weiland (1975) and Foster (1977).

III.

THEORY: THE PERSISTENT EFFECTS OF HUMAN CAPITAL
ON POLITICAL OUTCOMES

The current literature on the relationship between political stability and growth is
abundant, as outlined in section 2. However, I look to analyze the social structure
of education in Africa, in order to explain the rise and fall of failed states and the
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political stability of these regions throughout the second half of the twentieth
century. I theorize that educational attainment as a proxy for human capital
(Barro), is a major determinant of state stability, and that this effect has persisted
since the beginning of the independence era until today. At first glance, it is easy
to jump to the conclusion that higher human capital early on, should work to
increase the political and economic stability of a region, since the growth
literature points to such an effect of education on economic growth (Barro,
Romer). However, the structure of the education sector and the social inequality
prevalent in Africa during the independence era, points to three other possible
explanations.
•

Hypothesis 1: Higher Educational Attainment at both the secondary and
tertiary level leads to more political stability and lowers the probability of
state failure.

First, the higher initial human capital a region has early on in the independence
era, should translate to better state stability down the road. A highly educated
population is able to infuse new technological advancements and living conditions
should improve through this channel, which should lead to better political stability
in the future as the region progresses. Thus, African nations that had well
functioning educational institutions between 1950 and 1965, set up either from
colonial times or the new African government, were able to attain higher levels of
political stability later. In addition, higher educational attainment al all levels
early on may lead to a decline in social inequality, which would create more
stability in the region.
•

Hypothesis 2: Higher Educational Attainment at both the secondary and
tertiary level leads to more political instability and increases the
probability of state failure.

As African nations moved away from an agricultural based economy, towards
industrialization in the mid twentieth century, having an education became very
valuable is securing well paying and high status occupations. As Bates (1981)
notes, African governments implemented policy that removed incentives for
agricultural production. As African governments took advantage of workers in the
agricultural sector through the Marketing Boards put in place during colonial
times, these workers began to demand more formal education in the hopes of
acquiring jobs in the modern sector, however as the supply of qualified workers
exceeded demand many were left with no work. In turn, the masses ended up
worse off with an advanced degree and no place to work. Also, note that
competition within the elite class led to conflict and over supply, as more and
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more educated people were entering the job market. This led to increased political
instability as a new class of higher status elites captured a majority of the power
and amassed benefits from the state, le
leaving
aving the masses and lower status elites
behind. Such developments created an atmosphere conducive to conflict between
1950 and 1965, which would continue to escalate into major political instability
down the road.
•

Hypothesis 3: Higher Educational Attain
Attainment
ment at the secondary level and
tertiary level bring about different effects on state stabili
stability.

At the secondary level, increases in the initial level of human capital leads to
more political stability, while at the tertiary level, I expect to see more ppolitical
olitical
instability and an increase in the probability of state failure. In post
post-colonial
colonial
Africa, access to tertiary schooling became predominantly reserved for the elite
class, as access was quite limited for the rest of society. Thus, elites are able to
maintain their socioeconomic status in society by securing privileged access to
schools for their class, especially their children. In a society where the elite class
is able to secure higher education for themselves, they essentially neglect the
masses, who remain impoverished unable to move up the social ladder. In turn,
such an effect early on, would work to increase political instability. However, at
the secondary level, increasing levels of educational attainment would work to
increase stability as social
cial and economic inequality between the elite and masses
decreases over time.

IV.
•

THE EMPIRICAL STRATEGY
Estimating Framework

I estimate a generic Linear Probability Model (LPM) for State Failure by
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). I use a binary dependent variable, taking on a
value of one if a state failed between 1966 and 2014, regressed on a measure of
educational attainment at the secondary and tertiary level averaged over the
period 1950 to 1965 and a number of control variables. In addition, I also estimate
es
a simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression using a Political Instability
Index as my dependent variable, regressed on the same independent variables and
controls as stated above. More formally, the equation:

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015

5

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 11

where yi is the observed binary outcome of state failure or the Political Instability
Index in the OLS framework, sei measures secondary educational attainment, tei
measures tertiary education, and Xi represents a number of country level control
variables. The last variable is a standard normally distributed error term. The
parameters of interest are delta and gamma.
Xi is the set of control variables described in section 4 and summarized in more
detail in table 1 of the appendix: Economic Development (population density)
Ethnicity (Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization), Health (Total Life Expectancy at
Birth) Colonial Heritage (British Dummy). Outcomes are those outlined in section
5 and presented in Table 3 and 4. I also control for educational attainment at the
secondary and tertiary level in 2010, as well as the period between 1966 and
2014, in order to make sure that the effect of education on state failure persists,
and that the effect is not due to more recent levels of educational attainment.
These outcomes are those outlined in section 5 and presented in Table 2 and 4.
•

ECONOMETRIC ISSUES

It is important to note that the model presented above in section 4.1 does pose a
few econometric concerns. First, it remains plausible that control variables
included in previous specifications do not capture all necessary factors. In
addition, the small sample size of 31 countries is of course noteworthy, however
the educational attainment data necessary for my analysis is only available for
these 31 countries in Africa, which restricts my sample size. Last,
heteroskedasticity is present in the data. To be clear, my analysis looks to find a
causal relationship between early educational attainment and more recent political
stability in Africa. In order to identify such an effect, I control for the economic,
health, ethnic, and colonial characteristics of 31 countries in Africa between 1950
and 1965. I argue that these controls are the most precise and that they take into
account a large part of the additional characteristics that may account for
differences in political stability across Africa between 1966 and 2014.
First, I follow the existing literature and control for economic development using
a population density measure in order to take into account economic factors that
may have influenced political stability in the later period. I use this variable, since
there are limited measures of early economic development in Africa, In similar
fashion, I control for the general health of the population using total life
expectancy at birth to account for the possibility that a healthier population may
lead to more stability in the long run. In addition, I make sure to take into
consideration the ethnic variation between regions during the independence era in
Africa. I follow the existing literature by Easterly and Levine (1997), and take
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into account that ethnic conflict is an important determinant of the political
economy of many nations as it leads to political instability and disappointing
economic performance. I also use a dummy variable to distinguish between
countries that were under colonial rule by different European powers. I control for
the effect that different colonial policies and ruling tactics may have had on the
political stability of those states. Last, it may be the case that more recent
educational attainment has led to certain state political conditions rather than the
levels between 1950 and 1965. Thus, I control for such an effect using secondary
and tertiary educational attainment in 2010 as well as between 1966 and 2010. I
use these various controls in my estimation strategy and I find that my results are
robust to these factors.
Second, I must address the heteroskedasticity evident in the data. In the presence
of heteroskedasticity, my standard errors are sure to be biased and will lead to
bias in test statistics and confidence intervals. Since OLS assumes that errors are
both independent and identically distributed I employ robust standard errors to
correct for this effect. This allows me to correct for heteroskedasticity and
generate unbiased conclusions from my regression estimates.
Last, my sample size only includes 31 observations. Such a small sample size
raises concerns about robustness and validity. However, data from such an early
period in the developing world is not as complete as we would like. Therefore, my
choices are quite limited to the data available on educational attainment,
population density, Ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and total life expectancy at
birth between 1950 and 1965. I believe that I have employed the relevant methods
in order to generate robust results and identify a persistent causal relationship
between education and political stability in Africa.

V.

DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table 6 provides descriptive statistics for the key variables of interest and control
variables. Note that my sample consists of 31 observations. The small sample size
is one of the main shortcomings of the data presented in this analysis. Table 6
outlines number of observations, mean, standard deviation, maximum values, and
minimum values for each variable used in the study. Most notably, secondary
school completion rates among my sample ranges from .2 to 11.8 percent, while
tertiary school completion rates only range from 0 to 2 percent of the 20 to 24
year old cohort. However, the mean value for secondary school completion rates
is 1.63, while for tertiary school completion rates the value is .309 percent. The
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data displays quite a large disparity between secondary and tertiary school
completion rates in Africa.
•

DEPENDENT VARIABLES

I follow Rotberg’s literature on failed states in constructing my main dependent
variable, State Failure. The variable is a binary outcome, since either a nation fails
or it does not. In line with Rotberg, I define “state failure” as the final outbreak of
civil war, ethnic intrastate conflict, or any major violence between distinct groups
with the intent to impose a unilateral result. These conflicts may arise from a
variety of sources, such as a government’s inability to provide political or public
goods to its people or increased corruption leading to excluded or discriminated
against groups who loose trust in the government. However, I do not explicitly
place a restriction on the way in which a state may fail in constructing my
variable. Although, I do confine such conflicts where more than 1000 deaths
occurred and leave out violence resulting from independence, since this is
universal to all African nations. To construct my dataset, I use The State Fragility
Index and War List constructed by the Center for Systemic Peace. The study
outlines 332 state conflicts across the globe from 1946 to the present day,
excluding conflicts resulting in less than 500 deaths. Conflicts include inter-state,
intra-state, civil, ethnic, communal, and genocidal violence and warfare. For
clarity, a country received a value of 1 if the “state failed” between 1966 and
2014, otherwise it received a zero value.
My secondary dependent variable, the Economist’s Political Instability Index
measures the social, economic and political factors associated with political
instability in 165 countries worldwide in 2009. The index ranks nation on a scale
of 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability) and has two components- an
index of underlying political instability vulnerability and an economic distress
index. The overall index is a simple average of the two component indexes and it
is comprised of 15 indicators in all. To be clear, the index takes into account
inequality (Gini Index), state history (date of independence), corruption
(economist intelligence unit country ratings), ethnic fragmentation (Alesina,
Alberto 2003), trust in institutions (Africa Barometer World Value Surveys),
status of minorities (Minorities at Risk Project), history of political unrest (PIFT
Database), risk of labor unrest (Economist Intelligence Unit, Risk Briefing), level
of social provision (Infant Mortality Rate), geographic neighbors (Economist
Intelligence Unit), Regime Type and Factionalism (Economist Intelligence Unit),
growth in income (Economist Intelligence Unit), unemployment rate (Economist
Intelligence Unit), and finally GDP per capita in 2007 (World Bank). However, I
only use the political instability component in my analysis, neglecting the
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economic indicators. I use this index to check the validity of the results I find
with my main dependent variable, State Failure (Any Case). I expect similar
results since a failed state should have a very high ranking on the Political
Instability Index.
•

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

In constructing my main independent variable, I follow existing literature on
economic development and measure educational attainment as a proxy for human
capital, using Barro and Jong-Wha Lee’s (2000) New Data Set of Educational
Attainment in the World. The data set includes primary, secondary, and tertiary
school completion rates for 146 countries at 5-year intervals from 1950 to 2010
for various cohorts ranging from 15 to 74. The data are estimates, using forward
and backward extrapolation from certain benchmark statistics. In particular, the
authors used census and survey data from UNESCO, Eurostat, and other sources
to provide benchmarks for school attainment by gender and age group. In my
case, I take the average of secondary school completion rates for the 20 to 24
cohort from 1950 through 1965 and do the same for tertiary schooling. For clarity,
I take the average of the years 1950, 1955, 1960, and 1965 for the 20 to 24 age
group. I leave out primary school completion rates as Barro (2010) finds that
primary educational attainment is insignificantly related to economic
development, and in my study primary school completion rates are insignificant
as well. I rather concentrate on higher levels of education in my study.
I control for Economic Development (Population Density, Latitude), Ethnicity
(Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization), Health (Total Life Expectancy at Birth, Infant
Mortality Rate per 1000 Births) Colonial Heritage (British Dummy) from 1950 to
1965. In addition, I control for 2010 educational attainment at the secondary and
tertiary level as well as for educational attainment in the period 1966-2010 for the
20 to 24 age cohort. Details are outlined in Table 5 of the appendix.

VI.

REGRESSION RESULTS

Tables 1-4 present the regression results. Table 1 and 2 present results for the
simple Linear Probability Model (LPM) estimation by Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS), where the dependent variable is State Failure. Table 1 consists of five
columns, where the first presents results for the reduced form estimation including
all 31 countries. Column 2-5 present results including controls for economic
development, ethnicity, health measures, and colonial heritage. Table 2 presents
results for the persistent effect of education, controlling for educational attainment
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at the secondary and tertiary level in 2010 and the period between 1966 and 2014.
Column 1 presents results for the reduced form estimation including all 31
countries, while column 2-4 includes the education controls. Table 3 and 4 present
results for the simple Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimation, where the
dependent variable is the Political Instability Index. The regression results in table
3 and 4 are formatted identically to table 1 and 2. Note that below each
coefficient, I present corresponding standard errors and I note the significance
level next to each coefficient. In addition, I present the $R^2$ statistic in the last
row of each column.

•

LPM RESULTS

Table (1) in the appendix presents results for the Linear Probability Model (LPM)
estimation by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) of the form presented in equation
(1), using State Failure as my dependent Variable. First, note that the effect of
educational attainment at the secondary level increases and stays highly
significant at the 5 and 10 percent level across specifications. On the other hand,
the effect of educational attainment at the tertiary level slightly decreases across
specifications and the significance level falls from significant at the 1 percent
level to 10 percent once all controls are taken into consideration.
To be specific, the reduced form estimation shows that a one percentage point
increase in educational attainment at the secondary level between 1950 and 1965,
decreases the probability of state failure between 1966 and 2010 by
approximately 7.5 percent. Once controlling for economic progress, ethnic
variation, health measures, and colonial heritage, I find that a one percentage
point increase in educational attainment at the secondary level decreases the
probability of state failure by roughly 8.9 percent. In addition, a one percentage
point increase in educational attainment at the tertiary level between 1950 and
1965, increases the probability of state failure between 1966 and 2014 by
approximately 30 percent. Once again controlling for economic progress, ethnic
variation, health measures, and colonial heritage, I find that a one percentage
point increase in educational attainment at the tertiary level increases the
probability of state failure by 27 percent.
However, I then control for education at the secondary and tertiary level in 2010
and throughout the period 1966 to 2010. I conduct this exercise to check for
persistent effects of early educational attainment, rather than the effect of more
recent education. Results for this specification are presented in table (2) in the
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appendix. I find similar results to those presented in table (1). Tertiary educational
attainment and secondary educational attainment both remain significant across
all specifications.
At the secondary schooling level, I find that controlling for educational attainment
at both the secondary and tertiary level in 2010, a one percentage point increase in
educational attainment between 1950 and 1965, decreases the probability of state
failure between 1966 and 2014 by approximately 8.8 percent. Controlling for
average educational attainment between 1966 and 2010, I find that a one
percentage point increase in secondary educational attainment decreases the
probability of state failure by 8.1 percent. At the tertiary schooling level, I find
that controlling for educational attainment at both the secondary and tertiary level
in 2010, a one percentage point increase in educational attainment between 1950
and 1965, increases the probability of state failure between 1966 and 2014 by
approximately 27 percent. Controlling for average educational attainment
between 1966 and 2010, I find that a one percentage point increase in tertiary
educational attainment increases the probability of state failure by 25 percent.
Importantly, I find that educational attainment at the secondary and tertiary level
in 2010 and throughout the period 1966 to 2010 are insignificant across all
specifications in table (2). These results indicate that only early educational
attainment is a significant determinant of state failure between 1966 and 2014.
Thus, the effect of early educational attainment has persisted over time.
•

OLS RESULTS

Table (3) in the appendix presents results for the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
estimation of the form presented in equation (1), using the Political Instability
Index as my dependent variable. First, note that secondary educational attainment
is negative and significant throughout all specifications. Second, tertiary
educational attainment is positive and highly significant at the 1 percent level
across specifications. These results are similar and robust to those found in table
(1) and (2). To reiterate, the Political Instability Index ranks countries on a scale
of 0 (no vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability).
The reduced form estimation, with no controls in column (1), indicates that a one
percentage point increase in educational attainment at the secondary level
between 1950 and 1965, decreases political instability by approximately .28 of an
index point. For example, such a movement on the 2009 Political Instability Index
is synonymous to transitioning from the political state of Zimbabwe to that of
South Africa. The results remain robust throughout as I add on the control
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variables. Once controlling for economic progress, ethnic variation, health
measures, and colonial heritage, I find that a one percentage point increase in
educational attainment at the secondary level decreases political instability by
approximately .29 of an index point. At the tertiary level, my results indicate that
a one percentage point increase in educational attainment between 1950 and
1965, increases political instability by approximately .85 of an index point.
Adding on the various control variables once again, my results remain robust and
the effect slightly increases. I find that a one percentage point increase in
educational attainment at the tertiary level increases political instability by
roughly .86 of an index point. Such a movement on the 2009 Political Instability
Index is synonymous to transitioning from the political state of Ivory Coast to that
of Sierra Leone.
Once again, I control for education in 2010 and throughout the period 1966 to
2010. I find similar results to my results in table (2), that secondary educational
attainment is negative and significant, while tertiary educational attainment is
positive and significant across specifications. Table (4) in the appendix presents
my results.
I find that once controlling for educational attainment at both the secondary and
tertiary level in 2010, a one percentage point increase in educational attainment at
the secondary level decreases political instability by approximately .29 of an
index point. Also, once controlling for average educational attainment between
1966 and 2010, I find that a one percentage point increase in educational
attainment at the secondary level decreases political instability by approximately
.36 of an index point. Last, I control for both, and find that the effect only
diminishes slightly. I find that a one percentage point increase in educational
attainment at the secondary level decreases political instability by approximately
.28 of an index point. At the tertiary level, controlling for educational attainment
at both the secondary and tertiary level in 2010, a one percentage point increase in
educational attainment increases political instability by approximately .89 of an
index point. Also, once controlling for average educational attainment between
1966 and 2010, I find that a one percentage point increase in educational
attainment at the tertiary level increases political instability by approximately .92
of an index point. With the addition of both education controls, I find that a one
percentage point increase in educational attainment at the tertiary level increases
political instability by roughly .9 of an index point.
These results indicate that using the Political Instability Index as my dependent
variable, I once again find a negative relationship between secondary education
and state stability, as well as a positive relationship between tertiary education
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and state stability. Also, I find that educational attainment at the secondary and
tertiary level between 1950 and 1965 both stay significant once controlling for
education in 2010, as well as the period 1966 to 2010. This indicates, that in was
in fact early education that had a significant effect on state stability in Africa
during the second half of the twentieth century. I once again find the additional
education controls to be insignificant, pointing to a persistent effect of early
educational attainment on state stability today.

VII.

INTERPRETATIONS

The results presented in table (1)-(4) most clearly resemble hypothesis 3 as stated
in section (3.3). To summarize, I find that higher levels of initial human capital at
the secondary level for individuals in the 20 to 24 year old cohort, throughout the
period 1950 to 1965, increases state stability and decreases the probability of state
failure. In addition, I find that higher levels of human capital at the tertiary level
decreases state stability and increases the probability of state failure in the later
period. To quickly reiterate, I find that a one percentage point increase in
educational attainment at the secondary level decreases the probability of state
failure by roughly 8.8 percent and decreases state stability by approximately .28
of an index point between 1966 and 2014 once I add on all controls. At the
tertiary level, I find that a one percentage point increase in educational attainment
increases the probability of state failure by roughly 27 percent and decreases state
stability by approximately .88 of an index point between 1966 and 2014 once all
controls are taken into consideration. The results are all quite robust across all
specifications in both estimation frameworks and support my hypothesis that
higher levels of human capital at the secondary and tertiary level bring about
different effects on state stability.
Importantly, I find that initial tertiary educational attainment levels during the
independence era in Africa, had a much larger effect on state stability and state
failure in more recent times than does secondary education. There are a few
possible interpretations of this finding. However, I must first extrapolate on my
findings in general.
First, it is clear that I find a positive effect of early human capital at the secondary
level on state stability. In post-colonial Africa, the elite class was quite small
compared to the majority of the African population. Therefore, increasing initial
human capital for the masses would allow them to infuse new technological
advancements and bring about better living conditions. This should lead to better
political stability in the future as the region progresses economically, and
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political stability follows. The African nations that had well functioning
educational institutions between 1950 and 1965, set up either from colonial times
or the new African government, were able to attain higher levels of political
stability later on. In general, increased education for the masses early on should
lead to a decline in social inequality, which would create more stability in the
region.
Second, I find a negative relationship between early human capital at the tertiary
level on state stability. In post-colonial Africa, elites were able to secure
privileged access to schools allowing them to maintain their socioeconomic status
in society. Such an effect early on would have a ripple effect on increasing
socioeconomic inequality in African society. As the elites continued to garner
additional political power, securing privileged access to schools for their class,
especially their children, they become more powerful and leave the rest of society
behind. In the end, the elites have amassed political and economic power, while
the masses remain impoverished, taken advantage of, and unable to move up the
social ladder. The socioeconomic inequality created by the dynamics of elitist
education would work to create conflict between the masses and the people in
power, leading to more political instability.
The class dynamics in Africa during the independence era can explain why
tertiary education had a larger effect on political stability than secondary
education. Upon independence in a majority of African countries, the more
educated black elites were able to gain power. Once in control, this group
continued to secure privileged access to higher levels of education and maintain
their positions within the class structure. More so, they made sure that their
children followed in their footsteps in securing the best education possible, while
the rest of society may have had access to education of a much lower quality or
none at all. Over time, such an atmosphere would be conducive to clashes
between the elite class and the larger lower class. Therefore, once the elite class
was in power it would have been very easy to suppress the rest and have a large
effect on state stability in the long run. Central to my thesis, I find that the effect
of educational attainment in the independence era, has persisted until today.

VIII.

CONCLUSION

This paper presents evidence that higher educational attainment at the secondary
level as a proxy for human capital between 1950 and 1965, decreases political
instability and the probability that a state fails between 1966 and 2014. Also, my
results suggest that tertiary education in the early independence era increased
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political instability in the later period. I discussed three hypothesis or causal
channels. I found that state stability is significantly determined by levels of
educational attainment at the secondary and tertiary level between 1950 and 1965.
A Linear Probability Model (LPM) by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) was used to
determine the probability of state failure, while a simple Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression was estimated to determine a country's level of political
instability. The results are robust to a set of controls including economic progress,
ethnic variation, health measures, colonial heritage, and educational attainment
estimates in 2010 and between 1966 and 2010.
To end, a discussion of education policy implemented by colonial governments
and newly self-dependent African governments is necessary. In addition, a call for
future research and data collection. Although I find robust results, we can not
ignore the legacy that policy in colonial times left on a country’s political outlook.
Specifically, the effect of education policy can be hard to empirically measure in
colonial times, so I share an example. Prior to independence in 1960, the Somali
state was split between British rule in the north and Italian rule in the south. Each
region had different education policies and when Somalia become independent,
and merged to form the United Republic of Somalia, education became a major
priority with the new government. However, progress was slow as the new
government was unable to reform and expand the education system effectively.
They had issues integrating the two different education systems developed by the
British and Italians. Today, Somalia is one of the most fragile states in the world.
The country went through civil war in 1988 and total state collapse in 1991. The
events in Somalia help stress the role that education plays in the developing
world. To finish, my results may indicate that countries who were able to decrease
educational inequality, by focusing on the accessibility of education for the
masses in the independence era, were able to create a more stable economic and
political environments down the road. In short, education is an important
determinant of state stability and state failure.
Finally, more data and finding other creative ways to measure state failure,
education, and inequality in colonial times is necessary to improve our
understanding of the effect of education on political stability in the developing
world. Specifically, improving the measurement of human capital using the
quality of human capital rather than using years of schooling or completion rates.
It is clear that human capital accumulation is an important component of
economic growth as demonstrated in the literature, but understanding the root
cause of this human capital accumulation within Africa's social structure is an
integral part of such an analysis, which I hope to have shed some light on here.
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